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Last March I decided that, all things considered, my life would be
better if I never ate any more chocolate.1  In fact, I wrote it down in
my notebook:  "From here on, I have a rule against eating chocolate."
I followed that rule until September, when my sister came to town
for a visit and we went out to a fancy restaurant for dinner.  We had a
terrific time, and she decided to finish the meal with a large chocolate
dessert.  I think it was called "Chocolate Decadence," so you can imag-
ine what it was like.  But she insisted that we  share the  pleasure  by
dividing the dessert.  I thought about my rule and the circumstances I
was  in.  I  decided  that I didn't have  these  precise  circumstances  in
mind when  I formulated  my rule.  Taking everything  into  account,
including the pleasure  I would get from making my sister happy by
finishing the dinner with a shared  dessert, I  decided that, all  things
considered, I ought to eat some of the dessert.
I went back to my notebook after my sister left town.  Now I wrote
a revised rule:  "I will not eat chocolate unless my sister is in town and
she orders a chocolate dessert that she wants to split with me."  I con-
cluded that my life would be better, all things considered, if I followed
that rule rather than the one  I had written down in March.
I've been thinking about my rule against eating chocolate  (except
sometimes)  since  October.  And I've gotten myself into a fix.  Now I
wonder about the following:  why shouldn't I simply say to myself, "I
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Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI.  L. REv. 871  (1991); Frederick Schauer, Formaism, 97
YALE Lj. 509  (1988);  Frederick  Schauer,  Precedent, 39  STAN.  L. REv.  571  (1987).  I
refer only occasionally  to specific points made in those articles, but their arguments
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1  I use  "my life would be better" as a surrogate for whatever criteria I have for
determining a course of action.  The one criterion  that requires  special  attention  is
this: "My life would be better if I followed the rules I have  made for myself no matter
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won't  eat chocolate  except when  I  conclude  that, all things  consid-
ered, my life will be better if I do eat it"?  But I surely don't have a rule
in place of any significance if that's the question I ask myself. At most
I have  a  rule  of thumb,  or a presumption,  against eating chocolate.
But the presumption  has no impact whenever I  actually  go through
the exercise of trying to figure out whether, all things considered, my
life would be better if I ate or refrained from eating chocolate on any
particular  occasion.2  It's  important to  note  that not  having  a  rule
against eating chocolate doesn't mean that I'll eat chocolate whenever
I feel like it.  I'm going to make a judgment every time  the question
comes  up about whether  it  would be best, all things considered, for
me  to  eat or refrain  from  eating chocolate.  And  lots  of times  that
judgment will go against eating chocolate.
How would  a  rule against eating  chocolate  function?  Of course
there are always  reasons not to eat chocolate,  and I  ought to  abstain
when the balance of reasons favors abstention.  But the rule does not
in itself provide reasons relating to health, happiness, and the like, for
abstention.  Indeed,  it  has to keep me  from thinking about the rea-
sons for abstaining or consuming for it to work as a rule. The rule, qua
rule,  would  keep  me  from  eating  chocolate  even  in  circumstances
where my all-things-considered judgment (if I made one) was that my
life would be better if I ate it.  But it seems  quite irrational for me to
refrain from eating chocolate when I actually have an all-things-consid-
ered judgment  that my life would be better if  I ate  it.  At least that
seems so if being rational means doing the things that make your life
better.
So, I have  to  say to myself, "because  I have  a rule against eating
chocolate, I won't even think about whether, all things considered, my
life would be better if  I ate some  now," to satisfy  even minimal stan-
dards of rationality.  The rule keeps me from engaging in the full-scale
evaluative  process.
But I'm still puzzled.  Is  it any more rational  to refrain from en-
gaging  in  a  full-scale  consideration  of what,  all  things  considered,
would be best for me, than it is to refrain from doing what, all things
considered, I conclude would be best for me?
Of course  I  realize  that last  March  I  was  in  a particularly good
position to determine what, all things considered, would make my life
better.  I'd seen my doctor recently, but not too recently, and he told
me  that it  would be a  good idea  if  I kept my weight  down.  But he
didn't suggest that there was any serious immediate threat to my life if
2  The presumption  functions  as a  "bursting bubble,"  in  the lingo of evidence
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I didn't  And I hadn't gone through a recent binge of overindulgence
in chocolate,  so I wasn't feeling pangs of guilt.
But all that says is that I recognize  that sometimes circumstances
are  particularly  favorable  for  making  accurate  all-things-considered
judgments.  Today I have to consider two possibilities.  The easier one
is  this: my circumstances  now are  not as favorable,  so  the all-things-
considered judgment I make today will not actually be as accurate  as
the  one embodied in  my rule  against eating  chocolate.  And, more
important, I  know  this.  That is,  I have  compared  my circumstances
now to the ones facing me in March, and I see that my present circum-
stances are likely to distort my current all-things-considered judgment.
Making that judgment gives me a reason to follow my rule: the reasons
I had then apply to me now, even  though my first reaction was that
they didn't.
The second possibility is more complicated.  Here  I think-erro-
neously-that my present circumstances  are just as favorable  as they
were in March.  My rule simply isn't going to help if I do.  Again, the
rule makes a difference if it not only bars me from making all-things-
considered judgments, but also bars me from thinking about whether
the circumstances under which I developed the rule were particularly
favorable.
And again, this seems  close to irrational: last March I was in one
set of circumstances,  today I am in another, and the rule tells  me I
can't ask whether my prior circumstances  were particularly favorable.
But then I literally have no reason to think that my prior judgment,
embodied in the rule against eating chocolate, is better than my pres-
entjudgment.  (For all I know, my circumstances  last March were par-
ticularly  unfavorable  to  making  a  good  all-things-considered
judgment.)  I would be deferring to ajudgment made in the past sim-
ply because the past was a year ago, which hardly seems rational.
But perhaps  I should defer to that judgment not because  it was
made in the past, but because it was made, period. I'm going to face
lots of occasions on which I have to decide whether to eat chocolate,
and in a huge proportion  of them I'll conclude that I shouldn't, all
things considered.  The net betterness  of my life will  be higher if I
simply follow a rule against eating chocolate, taking into account the
loss I suffer from not eating chocolate when doing so would make my
life  better  and the  gains  I  accrue  by  saving  time  thinking  about
whether my present circumstances  are better than last March's.
Now my only problem is that I actually don't have a rule against
eating chocolate.  I have a rule against eating chocolate  except when
I've gone out to dinner with my sister.  But my deliberative process was
one  of first formulating a  rule,  then  testing it against  new  circum-
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stances  to see whether I  should make  an exception  in these circum-
stances-or, perhaps more  accurately, whether I should  reformulate
my rule to take better account of the circumstances  in which the ques-
tion of eating chocolate  arises.3
The  possibilities  of making  exceptions  and reformulating  rules
undermine my ability to economize on decisionmaking.  I have to ask
whether I  ought to make  an exception  to the rule because  new cir-
cumstances  have  arisen  instead of asking whether I ought to  depart
from the rule because my decisionmaking capacity is better now than
it was last March.
4
The  problem  can  arise  in  both  directions:  I  can  ask  myself
whether the rule I adopted in March  really was,  "Never eat chocolate,"
or whether it was, "Never eat  sweets."  Either formulation  is  compatible
with the words written in my notebook, and both might make my life
better, depending on a range of contingent facts about the world and
my circumstances.
But  this  underestimates  the  importance  of  the  rule's  words.
Surely, I might think, consulting my notebook won't make any differ-
ence at all if I'm trying to decide whether to order venison or veal at
my dinner with my sister.  "Chocolate"  or "sweets" just aren't words
relevant  to  that decision.  Similarly, consulting  the  notebook won't
help if, after deciding that my life would be better, all things  consid-
ered, if I had some chocolate, I have to help my sister choose which of
two rather attractive chocolate  desserts we should share.
This  conclusion  isn't  quite  right  either.  I  adopted  my  rule  in
March  for some  reasons, and  those reasons  might give  me some gui-
dance  on  the  choice  between  venison  or  veal,  or between  the  two
chocolate desserts.  But clearly it will take more thought for me to use
my antichocolate  rule to resolve those questions than it does for me to
use it to refrain from having a Hershey@  bar as an afternoon snack.
In our ordinary discourse, the word chocolate doesn't immediately call
forth to our minds  a category  that readily includes  either venison or
3  So, for example, it's not obvious why my "new" rule is against eating chocolate
except when  I'm going out to dinner with my sister: suppose I am visiting her; sup-
pose she doesn't order a Chocolate Decadence dessert;  suppose she doesn't indicate
that she wants to share the dessert.  What is the rule I developed when she visited me
in September?
4  Cf Jon Elster,  Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider  Problem, 1 EcoN.  & PHIL.  231,
261  (1985)  (A person  contemplating  making  an  exception  "could  be justified  in
thinking  that  an  exception  could  have  bad  precedence-setting  effects,  given  his
known  psychological propensity to wishful thinking.  He would then act rationally in
taking precautions  against his  own known irrational  tendencies.").
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veal.5  The rule's words, that is, make some work necessary if I am to
pursue a course that in the end is better for me, all things considered.
And,  naturally, the  cost  of doing that work  is  something  I  have  to
build into my all-things-considered judgment.
For a while I thought that I was wondering about a problem of
weakness  of will, or akrasia, as  the philosophers call it.  But my prob-
lem  is not really one of weakness  of will, and the  analysis of akrasia
turns out to be unhelpful.
Jon Elster  defines  weakness  of will  as  refraining from  pursuing
the course of action that you know is the better one.6  And you know it
is the better one at the time you actually make the decision to act. But
my problem  is  that, as  far as  I can tell, my will isn't weak at all: I'm
confident that my present all-things-considered judgment is at least as
good as the one I made last March,  even though it leads me to make a
different decision about eating chocolate  now. 7
In addition, figuring out what to do in the face of weakness of will
is  tricky.  Elster  and Robert  Cooter  suggest  that you  can  deal  with
weakness of will by "act[ing] through the external environment."8  For
5  In George Ainslie's terms, the category chocolate has "boundaries which cannot
be moved just a little bit."  George Ainslie,  Beyond Microeconomics. Conflict Among Inter-
ests in a Multiple Self as a Determinant  of Value, in  THE MULTIPLE SELF  149 (Jon Elster ed.,
1986).
6  Elster, supra note  4, at 250  ("Weakness  of the will  consists  in acting  against
one's  own better judgment, in  doing what one believes,  all things, considered,  one
should not do.");  see also ALFRED  R.  MELE,  IRRATIONALr.  AN  ESSAY  ON  Akrasia, Self-
Deception, and Self-Control 7  (1987)  ("An  action A is a strict  incontinent action if and
only if it is  performed intentionally and  freely and, at the  time at which  it is  per-
formed, its agent consciously  holds a judgment to the  effect that there is good and
sufficient reason for his not performing an A at that time.");Jon Elster, Introduction to
RATIONAL  CHOICF 15  (Jon Elster ed., 1986)  ("Akrasia is characterized  by the following
features.  (1) There  is a prima fade judgement that X is good;  (2) There  is a prima
facie judgement that Y is good;  (3)  There is an all-things-considered judgement that
X is best;  (4) There  is the fact that Y is chosen.").
7  That is, I don't experience myself as being "tempted" or "losing my head."  Cf
Elster, supra note  4, at 252  (Weakness of will occurs  when a person  "loses his head
when the temptation of the short-term reward becomes imminent.").  Rather, I expe-
rience myself as fully reflective, aware of, but in the end rejecting, the possibility that I
am indeed being tempted.  Strikingly, Amlie Oksenberg Rorty, Self-Deception, Akrasia
and Irrationality, in THE  MULTIPLE SELF,  supra note  5,  at  120-21,  describes  habitual
behavior as  "[s]ometimes  ...  the easy  course,"  because  it overrides  my "occurrent
motives."  See  also  id. at  123-24  (discussing  "the  familiar,  the  habitual,  the  easy
course").
8  Jon  Elster,  The Impact of Rights on Economic Performance, in WESTERN  RICHTs?
POsT-COMMuuxsT  APPLICATION 347, 354 (Andrs Saj6 ed., 1996).  The utility of exter-
nal agencies recurs in the relevant literature.  See,  e.g., Ainslie,  supra note  5,  at 144
(describing  enforcement  of  private  rules  by  "extrapsychic  devices");  id. at  154
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example,  Cooter establishes  that my life will be better overall if (a) I
can create an agency  that will prescribe  an anti-chocolate-eating  rule
because I will be better off in the long run ifI don't eat chocolate, and
then  (b)  have  the agency  enforce the rule whenever  I eat chocolate
even  though  I  don't actually  suffer  any immediate  harm  from  my
"lapse."9  Unfortunately, I don't stand in that sort of external relation
to myself.10
Cooter suggests another strategy.  I will  refrain from eating choc-
olate if I can somehow get myself into a mind-set where I really regret
doing so."  The problem here is that I can't figure out how to do that.
Elster elsewhere  has described some states of mind as  "essentially by-
products"-ones "that... can only come about as  the by-product of
actions undertaken  for other ends. '12  An  enhanced  capacity for re-
gret seems to me to be such a state.
The question  then is, what other ends might I pursue whose  by-
product is that enhanced capacity?  Someone cleverer than I might be
able to come up with a better candidate, but the best one I can imag-
ine  is something  like,  "The construction  of a character  as  a person
who always  follows the rules."13
But here's the problem  I have with that candidate:  how can I go
about cultivating such a character in a way that won't collapse under
very slight pressure?  My guess is that we develop characters  as people
who always follow the rules by always following them in small matters.
Before  we  have  become  rule-following  types,  we  follow  the  rules  in
small matters because we conclude that calculating what would be best
all  things considered just isn't worth  the effort given the stakes.  But
(describing private rule against taking a break unless a friend  invites me, and assert-
ing "my problem  is solved"  "if my friend  is a 'good' friend").
9  Robert  D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards an
Economic Theory of  the Will,  11 INT'L REV.  L. & ECON.  149,  154 (1991).  So, for example,
I could hire you to rap me over my knuckles whenever I ate chocolate, but then you'd
have  to follow me around to check up on me.
10  Cf  Elster,  supra note  4,  at  257  (introducing  external  agency  "amounts  to
changing the terms of the problem out of recognition").  Sometimes the metaphor of
a "divided" self is useful for heuristic purposes, but in the end the metaphor can't be
cashed out as an accurate description.  For a collection  of essays on this concept, see
THE  MULTIPLE  SELF,  supra note 5.
11  THE MULTIPLE  SELF,  supra note 5, at 158.
12  JON  ELSTER,  SOUR GRAPES:  STUDIES  IN  THE  SUBVERSION  OF  RATIONALrrY  43
(1983).
13  Cf Elster, supra note 4, at 258 ("[C]hoices in the present set up a mental habit
or disposition  that shapes future  choices, and..,  present choices ought to  take ac-
count of that effect."); Rorty, supra note 7, at 122-23  (describing role of character in
motivating preferences).  Note that this is also, but I think less interestingly, the char-
acter of a person who places value on following the rules no matter what.
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gradually following the rules becomes second nature, and we don't do
the calculation  at all.
Unfortunately,  the  tiniest bit  of self-consciousness  undermines
this strategy.14  The problem is a cousin of the problem of exceptions:
why don't I develop the character of someone who always follows the
rules when the stakes are small?  I have to decide which kind of person I
am as soon  as I confront a situation in which  the stakes are higher,
and at that point my state of mind is no longer a by-product. 15
A second strategy focuses on the necessity to do conceptual work
when the possibilities of developing an exception to a rule or of refor-
mulating it arise.  I won't do the conceptual work if I think of myself
as a "plain-meaning kind of guy."  Rules are straightforward linguistic
statements whose meanings are apparent to me upon reading them.16
Again my imagination  may be limited, but I can't figure  out how I
could develop  that self-understanding  as a by-product  of some other
endeavor.  And, again, self-consciousness about being a plain-meaning
kind of guy undermines my ability to give reasons for rejecting refor-
mulations of my initial rule.
I think the difficulty with these character-based accounts of how I
might treat my March resolution as a rule is this: the character traits
they invoke seek to make rule-following an activity that occurs without
conscious  awareness.  But questions  about rule-following  arise when-
ever it occurs to me to wonder whether it makes sense to follow some
particular rule, all things considered.  Whenever it matters, then, the
question of whether to follow a rule is always  a matter about which I
will be consciously aware.
The  connection  between  these  speculations  and law  should  be
reasonably clear.  I have been examining whether my self at time,, has
14  Cf David Pears,  The Goals and Strategies of Self-Deception, in THE  MULTIPLE  SELF,
supra note 5, at 70-71  (arguing that self-deception requires  "functional insulation" of
deceived  subsystem from the deceiving one).
15  On the level of subjective phenomenology, I can report the following- I am a
person who does  indeed follow the rules  nearly all the  time, and sometimes I feel
really foolish for doing so.  One example is that I assiduously report as income every
honorarium I receive, including those for reading manuscripts or doing tenure evalu-
ations, even when I have not received a Form  1099-MISC from the people paying me
the honorarium  and even  though I know that the Internal Revenue  Service doesn't
match these 1099 forms with reported income anyway.  A familyjoke is that we say we
ought to avoid doing anything that we wouldn't be willing to defend before a Senate
confirmation committee, but in my case that is hardly a realistic possibility, and so it is
not a realistic external constraint on my developing a character as a rule-follower.
16  Cf MLE,  supra note 6, at 126  (describing selective focusing as source of self-
deception).
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any  claim  to priority  over my self at time2. Translated  to  the legal
arena, we can see this as the problem of precedent. 17  At time, a court
makes a rule.  The function of the rule appears to exclude some mat-
ters from a  decisionmaker's  ken:  it will follow  the rule  it has  devel-
oped rather than engage  in an all-things-considered judgment.
Schauer has established, at least to my satisfaction, that the rule-
based strategy  satisfies  the demands  of rationality when  the court is
saying something to someone  else and believes that its target will do
better overall if the target-a police officer, a city council, a state legis-
lature-follows  the rule  and does  not attempt  itself to make  an  all-
things-considered  judgment.  Of  course  the  target  will  sometimes
make mistakes-do things that, all things considered, make the world
a worse place.  But, Schauer argues, targets will also make mistakes in
doing the all-things-considered  calculation.  And  the world will be a
better place if the court's rule  produces fewer errors  (or smaller  er-
rors) by targets than would directing targets  to do the right thing, all
things considered.
All this seems right to me.  But it depends on a set of assumptions
that seems to me problematic when we consider a court in relation to
"itself," which  is what is  involved  in a precedent  system.  My  earlier
discussion  identified  two  characteristics  of time-linked  decisionmak-
ing that made problematic my reliance on a prior rule.  The first is  a
question about the  quality-linked circumstances of decision: whether the
circumstances  under which  the  second  decision  is  made  are  more
favorable or less favorable to making good all-things-considered judg-
ments.  The second is a question about the relevance-linked  circumstances
of  decision:  whether  it  makes  sense  to  forbear  from  examining
whether  the second  decision would  apply to different circumstances
than the first.
There  are a number  of issues  here.  First, Schauer's  defense  of
formalism works when the court is better at making the all-things-con-
sidered judgment  than its  target.  After  all, the court has  to  decide
that, all things  considered,  the world would be better if the targets
followed the rule  the court articulates.  But it seems incoherent for a
court to  say that it is better at devising a rule,  all things  considered,
than  it is  at making  an all-things-considered judgment.  The court's
target in a precedent system is, at first cut, itself, and it is quite hard for
me  to see how a court could think that it was better at making rules
responsive to all-things-considered  concerns than in making all-things-
considered judgments.
17  Elster describes this as a problem of intertemporal choice.  Elster, supra note 4,
at 234.
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Perhaps, however, I am wrong in saying that the court's target is
itself.  Rather, its target is a court in the future.'8  And, it is  easy to
understand how a court might think that, no matter how good it is at
making all-things-considered judgments, things are likely to degener-
ate.  Later courts, the real targets of precedents, are not going to be as
good as  today's court.
On this view, precedent makes some sense.  But not much, or at
least only under quite restricted circumstances.  Consider first a court
making a rule to regulate  the conduct of police  officers.  The court
can expect its rule to be followed when it reasonably believes that of-
ficers will respond to the  court's signals.  And one way, perhaps  the
primary way, of inducing responsiveness  is to enforce the rule.  That is,
the court induces responsiveness by imposing some sanction on non-
complying officers until compliance becomes second nature.
But, once  again, a court at time1  is  not in a position to induce
compliance by a later court in the same way.  When the time comes to
apply the precedent, after all, the court that developed the precedent
is no longer around.  The new court is  going to have  to say to itself,
"our predecessors developed  the rule we are asked to apply today be-
cause they didn't think we were going to be very good at making all-
things-considered judgments.  And you know something?  They were
right."
I think we  are entitled  to be skeptical  about  how likely this re-
sponse  is  as a general matter.  Schauer suggests  that the later court
may  say to itself, "[i]f Cardozo  decided  this way, who  am I to  disa-
gree?" 19  Here  the  later  court  recognizes  that a prior  court was  a
higher quality court, and defers to its judgment.  But notice how im-
portant is the fact that the later court refers to Cardozo, an extraordi-
narily eminent judge.  Few judges  are likely to say to themselves,  "If
Hiscock decided this way, who am I to disagree?" 20  Courts at time2 are
rather more likely to say to themselves, 'We  are just as good at making
all-things-considered judgments  as  our  predecessors  were.  (On  the
18  In  Elster's terms,  this  is  an interpersonal  and intertemporal  problem.  Id&  at
232.
19  Frederick  Schauer, Preceden4 39  STAN.  L. REV.  571,  575  (1987).  Schauer de-
scribes this as "conserv[ing]  present decisional  resources," but it seems to me more
like deferring to the judgment  of a particularly well-respected prior decisionmaker.
Id.
20  Frank H. Hiscock served with Cardozo on the NewYork Court of Appeals.  He
was one of the sponsors of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, and wrote a concurring
opinion in New  York  v.  Citlow, 136 N.E.  317  (N.Y. 1922).  See Stephen  Botein, Frank
Harris  Hiscock, in DIcrIoNARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 379  (John A. Garraty & Edward
T. James eds., Supp. 4 1974).
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whole, more of our predecessors  were  Hiscocks than  Cardozos.)  So
we  are  going to decide whether, all  things  considered,  we ought to
follow the rule  they articulated."  And again  the rule operates  as no
more  than a rule of thumb.  The  reasons the court at time,  had for
developing  its rule are  equally available to the court at time2, and to
the extent that  those reasons support the rule  the court at time2 will
rearticulate  the rule.  Not, however, because it is bound to do so by
precedent, but because the rule makes  sense,  all things  considered.
We might think that the court at time2 would want to support a
precedent system so that it could control courts at times, time4, and so
on. Just as the court at time, expected degeneration  in  quality, so can
the court at time2. But the problem would simply recur:  why would
the court at time3, fools that they may be, think they were as stupid as
the court at time2 expected  them to be?
The strategic problem facing the court at time, is  this: the court
has to assume that courts at time2 and after will believe  themselves to
be no less smart than  the court at time1. It  is unable to enforce  the
rules directly by imposing sanctions on the later courts.  It  has to de-
velop some way of inducing  compliance nonetheless.  As before,  the
best candidate is probably to attempt to induce in later courts a habit
of rule-following.  And, as before, it is unclear to me how the court at
time1  can do that.  Of course it can follow the precedents handed it,
and hope that its rule-following  behavior will induce  later courts  to
follow the rules  they are handed.  But in doing so the court at time1
forgoes any chance it has to make the very rules it hopes to hand on to
later courts.  Any effort to innovate  shows later  courts  that they too
can innovate, and perhaps with respect to the rule the court at time1
cares most about.  Finally, to the extent that inducing behavior in  a
target by one's own behavior  is undermined  by the target's self-con-
sciousness  about what is occurring, it is worth noting that legal proce-
dures force self-consciousness  upon the courts, as adversaries bring to
their attention competing ways  of understanding the  rules they must
interpret  and then apply.21
Consider  next  the  relevance-linked  circumstances  of decision.
Suppose  a  court is  asked to decide whether a state  law barring indi-
gent recent  arrivals from  receiving  emergency  medical  care violates
the Constitution.  A judge proposes to write  an opinion invalidating
21  In Pears's terms, the adversary system  routinely undermines the functional in-
sulation that can sustain the process  of inducing the target's behavior by one's own.
Pears, supra  note 14.  In Ainslie's terms, the adversary system precludes  the possibility
of controlling a court's attention by keeping the opportunity for distinguishing situa-
tions out of sight.  Ainslie, supra note 5, at 144.
[VOL.  72:5 15921997]  SELF-FORMALISM,  PRECEDENT,  AND  THE  RULE  OF  LAW
the state law on the ground that it violates a constitutionally protected
right to travel.  Concerned about the national government's ability to
regulate travel to and from other countries, anotherjudge objects that
there  is no  generalized  right to travel, but  only a right to interstate
travel.  The opinion as published finds the statute unconstitutional  as
a violation of a protected  right to interstate travel.
Ten years  later a lower  court is  asked  to decide  whether a na-
tional statute barring travel to countries designated by the Secretary of
State as terrorist nations  is unconstitutional.  The judge  can use  the
medical care case as a precedent to uphold the statute or invalidate it.
The prior case recognized  only a right to interstate  travel,  the judge
might say, and thereby implicitly rejected the broader constitutional
claim necessary  to support the challenge here.  Or, the judge might
say, the prior case rested on a broad right to travel, formulated  as  a
right to interstate  travel  only because  that was  the context in which
the medical  care case arose.
The techniques  our later judge would deploy are boringly famil-
iar-second nature, one might say.  And they are quite generally avail-
able.  Suppose, for example, that the international travel case came up
first, and the court held the statute unconstitutional.  Even that would
not require the laterjudge to invalidate the medical care statute.  That
statute implicates federalism concerns that were absent in the interna-
tional travel case,  the later judge  could fairly say,  and the need for
states to control their treasuries outweighs individual interests in inter-
state travel even though that national interest in responding to terror-
ism does not outweigh individual interests in international travel.  Nor
are these cases intrinsically "travel" cases  only.  On the broadest level
they can later be taken  to deal with aspects  of personal  liberty best
described  as the interest in autonomous  control over important life
decisions.
It would seem, then, that the rule articulated at time1 can't control
a decision  at time2. But of course  it can  influence such a  decision.
Sometimes it can do so because itjust isn't worth anyone's effort to try
to distinguish the precedent.  True, a different or modified rule might
make the world a bit better (although it might not), but the marginal
gain isn't large enough to overcome the cost of working out the new
rule.  Note, however,  that here  the precedent doesn't give  the later
court a reason  for acting other than saving time and energy.
Precedents can influence later decisions in a different way.  Sup-
pose  the marginal  gain from  a new rule would be substantial  rather
than small.  Precedents might sometimes block us from realizing that
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gain.22  The work needed to distinguish the precedents might be quite
substantial as well.  Decisionmakers  pressed to do many things might
think it inappropriate  to devote  too much effort to figuring out how
to maneuver  among the precedents in any particular case.23
There are at least two ways in which this might happen.  As I sug-
gested earlier,  the  rule  articulated  at time1  might use  terms  that re-
quire the later court to do a lot of conceptual work to distinguish  or
extend the rule.  In addition, I used the plural term precedents here to
suggest that the influence of precedents may increase  as they accumu-
late.  The idea is that the accumulated precedents might increasingly
narrow the range within which a later court can maneuver.  It's rela-
tively easy to distinguish one  case, much  harder to distinguish five  or
ten.  The  difficulty with  this argument is that it takes  time for prece-
dents  to accumulate.  And over time, the earlier precedents have  de-
creasing  influence-the  argument  that  the  earliest  precedent  was
decided  under  circumstances  relevantly  different  from  the  one  we
now face  becomes increasingly powerful.
So far I have proceeded on the assumption that we have no exter-
nal agency that can sanction judges who fail to follow precedent.  Per-
haps,  however,  we  should  understand  the  practices  through  which
judges are first socialized as lawyers and then selected as judges to be
such an agency.  Roughly speaking, nearly every person who becomes
a judge will believe  that precedent  really does and should constrain
(sometimes and to some degree).24  If the interpretive moves of distin-
guishing and generalizing are second nature to judges, so is the sense
of constraint by precedent  (again,  sometimes and to some degree).
On  this view, precedent  sometimes  constrains  to  some  degree,
but not because the  existence of a precedent provides  a reason for ad-
hering  to  it.  This  may  have  implications  for the form  in which  we
could defend the rule of law ideal.  Some defenses of that ideal rest on
the proposition that we are properly governed by law because,  and to
22  Of course, this would appear to undermine the argument that precedents con-
tribute to overall well-being.
23  This may be particularly so if the later court is not as clever as the first court.
Even  if the later court doesn't recognize  its relative stupidity, its stupidity may mani-
fest itself as an inability to do the conceptual  work needed to distinguish  the prece-
dents.  I should note, however, that a stupid later court might simply get impatient
with  the work,  throw up its hands, and write  a shoddy opinion that fails  to satisfy a
reasonable  lawyer's demand for adequate  treatment of the precedents.
24  For completeness, one would have to establish that the presence of rare excep-
tions would not transform  the judicial  institution.
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the extent that, law provides  reasons that all reasonable people in an
appropriate  frame  of mind should accept.25
That defense would not seem available under the view developed
here.  Consider for example a criminal defendant whose claim is re-
jected by ajudge whose reasons for affirming the conviction rest ulti-
mately on the ground that following precedents is generally a sensible
way  to  economize  on  decisional  resources.  From  the  defendant's
point of view, the judge is saying, "You are going to prison because I
am too lazy to do the intellectual work that would be needed to show
that your claim is legally justified."  I doubt that this would satisfy the
demands of the  rule-of-law defense  I have described.
Other defenses rest on the more modest proposition  that we are
properly  governed  by  law  because,  and  to  the  extent  that,  deci-
sionmakers  are constrained  to act on grounds other than  their per-
sonal preferences.  That defense remains  available.
But, it seems to me, that defense  resonates far less than the first
one, at least in today's political-legal culture.  Ifjudges are constrained
not by reason but by socialization, in today's culture it seems natural
to observe  that judges are  demographically  unrepresentative  and so-
cialized  into  a way  of thinking  that many find  curiously  truncated,
even if it does keep  them from simply forcing their personal prefer-
ences  on the rest of us.  These  observations  may weaken  the claims
that law has on us.  To that extent they are compatible with legal posi-
tivism's general program of replacing the conceptual  connection be-
tween  law  and  morality  offered  by  some  accounts  of  law,  with  a
connection  that is at most contingent and  always contestable.
25  I  have  sometimes thought that the next article in Schauer's  series of articles
with single-word titles should be "Law," in which he would directly confront the impli-
cations of his analyses for the defense of the rule of law.  In my view, his articles each
edge up to the conclusions I draw here, but then retreat, in part by making essentially
empirical assertions about, for example, the constraining force  of the categories  em-
bedded in the words lawyers use.  I should note, for completeness, that Schauer  does
not reject the conclusions I draw; he simply does not take his analysis to what seems to
me the logical next stage.
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